Stalin`s order that the German Communist Party should never again vote with the Social Democrats coincided with the “Union of Industrialists” with its approval in December 1928. As part of this agreement, the Union of Industrialists agreed to grant the Soviet Union a current armaments industry and an industrial base on two conditions: [35] Consider why Hitler`s request for the Sudetenland became an international crisis and assess the resulting agreement, reached by Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier. On 22 August 1939, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893-1946) flew from Berlin to Moscow. He soon found himself in the Kremlin, facing Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (1890-1986), who had worked with von Ribbentrop to negotiate an agreement. (The Soviet minister is also the name of the incendiary device known as the Molotov cocktail.) Ribbentrop made a proposal by Hitler for the two countries to commit to a 100-year non-aggression pact. Stalin replied that ten years would suffice. The proposal also provided that neither of the country-specific parties that attacked one of the two signatories would provide assistance. Finally, the proposal contained a secret protocol that defined the spheres of influence in Eastern Europe that both sides would accept after Hitler`s conquest of Poland. The Soviet Union acquired the eastern half of Poland, as well as Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The post-war state was particularly damaged by the technological successes of Soviet-German cooperation. The restrictions of the Treaty of Versaille did not prevent the advance of the German military technology mainly because of the work of the Reichswehr in Russia. Indeed, the Reichswehr has saved money for the research and development process through its program of producing prototypes and small tests. A combination of industrial espionage, willing trading partners outside Germany and cooperation with the Soviet Union allowed Germany to follow military developments elsewhere at a fraction of the cost of other military installations.

The failure of Western leaders to recognize this fact meant that they largely underestimated the technical capabilities of the German army during the crises of the late 1930s. The Soviet-German partnership shows how difficult it is to stop the military-technological development of pariah states. In a world where the United States is trying to impose nuclear non-proliferation and slow down the military-technological progress of its geostrategic enemies, the lessons of the Soviet-Soviet-German partnership remain valuable. Whether the interests of both parties make it desirable to maintain an independent Polish state and how such a state should be limited can only be definitively decided as policy evolves. The protocols received more media attention when they were incorporated into an official collection of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Nazi Relations 1939-1941, recorded by Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie, and published on January 21, 1948. The decision to publish the main documents relating to German-Soviet relations, including the treaty and protocol, had already been taken in the spring of 1947. Sontag and Beddie prepared the collection in the summer of 1947.

In November 1947, Mr. Truman authorized the publication in person, but was selected in the run-up to the December foreign ministers` conference in London. As the negotiations at this conference were not constructive from the American point of view, the document was sent to the press.